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Abstract
Japan has been aging faster than other industrialized nations, and its experience offers useful lessons to others. 
Japan has been willing to expand its welfare state with a long-term care (LTC) insurance to finance home care 
and nursing home care for frail elderly. As Ikegami shows, it created new facilities and expanded specialized 
staffing for home care, developed a country-wide assessment system and shifted responsibilities between the 
central and local authorities over that assessment and the determination of co-payments for LTC. Faced with 
rapid growth in demand for LTC, the government felt the need for new cost control measures. The Japanese 
experience illustrates that new social policies take time to develop. There is often a need to adjust. But there 
are also other lessons. The main one is that there is no direct relation between the degree of population aging 
and total health spending. While aging requires adjustments in the organization of care, and expanding LTC 
for frail elderly, international studies show there is no need to worry about the ‘unaffordability’ of aging. In 
this commentary, we have framed four “What, Why, Who, and How” questions about LTC to (re-)define the 
borderlines between public and private responsibilities for the range of activities for which some (but certainly 
not all) frail elderly as well as many non-elderly require support in daily life. 
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Introduction 
Japan has been aging faster than any other industrialized 
nation. Its experience is therefore important to others: how 
can we adapt to the aging of our populations, especially in the 
fields of pensions and healthcare? 
Brief, there are three possible policy directions. One is to 
counter that demographic process by trying to encourage 
families to have more babies to reverse the aging process (eg, 
as France has tried, by giving financial incentives, preferential 
access to public transport or education, and good childcare). 
The results of those policies have been mixed, to say the least, 
and do not seem to have turned around the trend of leveling off 
and even declining population size in many nations. It is also 
not clear whether the world need more population growth. 
The second policy direction is adjustment of public pension 
systems. German’s chancellor Bismarck set the threshold for 
old age pension for industrial workers in 1883 at 65 years. 
In 1883, policy-makers knew, these workers would live, on 
average, another 3 years after 65. Today, we live, on average, 
almost 30 years after that age but we still think of 65 as the 
retirement age (in some cases 67, but in several countries, well 
below that age). This demographic change obviously requires 
adjustments in pensions, for example, reversing trends of 
early retirement, freezing or even cutting pension payments 
and encouraging higher labor market participation.1-4 Many 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) (and other) countries have already taken such 
measures. 
There is little or no relation, however, between population 
aging and the level of healthcare spending.5-7 Some nations 
with much older population than the United States, for 
example Japan, Germany, or the United Kingdom, spend 
much less on healthcare, often with better outcomes in 
terms of life expectancy or child mortality. The incomes 
of health professionals, the use of medical technology and 
the organization of healthcare services are all factors that 
have played a greater role in determining the level of health 
spending than aging.8,9 That is also true for the costs of end-of 
life care.10,11 
A century ago, working people, especially the blue-collar 
beneficiaries of the German social insurance schemes, were 
generally worn out by the end of their working lives. Aging as 
a demographic process is no longer just a burden to society. 
There are several positive sides to aging.12 Nowadays the vast 
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majority of people in their 60s and 70s have good health 
and live independently.13,14 Some studies show that the total 
value of transfers of the older generation to their children 
and grandchildren is larger than the net cost of (public) 
pensions and long-term care (LTC). Many of the currently 
retired support their offspring financially and materially in 
paying for education, lending money to buy an apartment 
or house, and providing childcare or transportation services 
to grandchildren (see Gusmano and Okma7). Depicting 
populations over 65 as ‘frail dependent elderly’ is at least 
misleading. 
The need for support by family or external professionals 
generally only rises substantially after elderly reach 80 or 85 
years, and even at that age, only for a minority. The number of 
dependent frail elderly is growing rapidly, but it still represents 
a modest share of the total population. 
The third policy direction is therefore to accept the reality 
of aging populations and design policies that support this 
demographic change, including LTC. This brings us to our 
four “What, Why and Who, and How” questions. What is 
LTC; Why is it important to find an operational definition of 
the range of activities that fall under LTC; Who is involved; 
and How can we draw lessons from the experience of Japan 
(and from other OECD nations that have implemented LTC 
insurances)? 
1. What
When becoming frail, elderly need more support by family 
and others, including long-term (medical, nursing, and 
social) care. Ikegami15 refers to the definition of the Institute of 
Medicine: “…. a variety of ongoing health and social services 
provided for individuals who need assistance on a continuing 
basis because of physical or mental disability. Services can 
be provided in an institution, the home, or community, 
and include informal services provided by professionals or 
agencies.” That the Institute of Medicine definition is not very 
operational, however. As Ikegami argues, we need to define 
better what is it we are discussing. There is no clear borderline 
between services ‘for the elderly’ and others. For example, we 
all start our lives 100% dependent as pretty helpless babies 
and that dependency can last for many years. Second, adults 
with mental or physical handicaps may need life-long external 
support in their daily living. (There are also healthy adults 
who prefer to contract out (if they can afford to do so) many of 
the daily activities that would fall under the above definition 
of ‘LTC’). Even while focusing on the needs of disabled and 
elderly population groups we still need to make the term LTC 
more operational. 
2. Why
There are two important dimensions to LTC: time and 
scope. The time dimension means that in practice there is 
often a gradual expansion of the scope of LTC. For example, 
elderly who still live by themselves do need some help, first 
with filling in taxes or walking their dog, for example, then 
with gardening. The next stage may be some shopping and 
housekeeping. These are all activities often done by close 
relatives or neighbors, mostly spouses and children. Then, 
there may be increased need for daily personal care, like 
preparing food and dressing. That stage becomes more 
intimate with assistance in eating, showering, helping to go 
to the toilet and preparing to go to bed. It also overlaps with 
nursing care to preventing bed sores, wound care, taking 
medicines, and keeping contact with other medical care when 
needed, eg, in refilling prescriptions, referral and after hospital 
care. We thus take a wider perspective of LTC than Ikegami 
who mostly focuses on professional medical and nursing care.
The gradual increase of frailty or sometimes sudden onset 
of dependency, for example after hospitalization, often leads 
to a situation where spouses or children and other family 
members find themselves in care roles they had not really 
expected or planned for. Acknowledging the two dimensions 
of LTC requires planning ahead and thinking about future 
shifts in activities and responsibilities.
3. Who
Family members responsible for the LTC of the parents, 
grandparents or other aging relatives face important decisions 
during all those stages, often implicitly. Are spouses and 
children willing and able to face the growing burden of 
LTC? At what stage do they formally or de facto take over 
the decision-making power of their frail parents? How can 
they respect the preferences of the elderly themselves? Who 
is responsible for the finances? Is there enough money to hire 
external help for housekeeping and other daily activity (or 
long-term stay in a nursing facility)? What range of services is 
covered by public or private insurance? What are the financial 
conditions? Who is responsible for the copays and services not 
covered by insurance? Are there time limits of the coverage? 
Who is responsible for the coordination between the formal 
and informal services? 
Answering these questions requires a political debate about 
the shifting responsibilities between the private and the public 
domains. All industrialized nations have expanded public 
financing of LTC for elderly and other populations. At the 
same time, the largest part of LTC is still provided by spouses, 
children, neighbors and other informal caregivers (some 
studies estimate that up to 90% of all LTC still takes place 
within the family). In some cases, as in Japan, Germany and 
the Netherlands, informal care givers can receive financial 
compensation financed out of the cash benefit schemes. In 
parallel, there has been expansion of LTC services by (both 
for profit and non-profit) agencies. While there has been 
some growing acknowledgement of the principle of public 
(state) responsibility over LTC financing across nations, 
there is wide variety in the actual provision and organization 
of those services. In all cases, LTC involves many different 
stakeholders.
4. How
As noted above, most people over 65 live independently and 
consider themselves in good health (see also Gusmano and 
Okma7). We argue that redefining ‘aging’ for the purpose of 
LTC takes much of the sting out of the ‘tsunami of aging’ 
debate (for this argument see Gusmano and Okma7). A new, 
more realistic definition of aging as the population share 
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of over, say, 80 will show that we face demographic change, 
but the consequences are not as dramatic as many policy-
makers or politicians have assumed or feared. Moreover, 
demographic change is slow, so we have decades to adjust. So 
what adjustments? 
The first are fiscal ones. As mentioned above, the major 
extension of average life expectancy in the last century means 
that we have to adjust our pension systems. We have to 
make sure that the public pension systems include as many 
people as possible, as long as possible, joining early in life and 
contributing all trough working lives. Moreover, there is no 
reason to encourage early retirement or full retirement benefits 
without a minimum of, say, 35 to 40 years of contribution. 
The systems should also become more flexible in including 
part time workers and providing credits for taking time off to 
take care for very small children and frail parents or relatives. 
Importantly, the pension benefits should be high enough to 
cover a decent minimum cost of living (in the United States, 
over 60% of retirees depend on Social Security as the main 
income source16). At the same time, there is no reason to 
generally exclude elderly citizens from fiscal arrangements. 
The current generation of elderly is, on average, not poor. 
Many have accumulated investments, pension savings and 
other wealth and there is no reason to exclude those from 
taxing merely because of age. 
That situation is different for healthcare and LTC, however. 
The vast majority of retired US citizens have Medicare 
healthcare insurance. Still, many face high copayments and 
deductibles. Some studies estimate that in the US elderly over 
85 spent about US$24 000 out of pocket for LTC in 2017. 
With a Social Security income of about US$1400 per month, 
such costs are obviously not affordable for elderly without 
substantial additional pension incomes and savings. 
After defining LTC as the range of activities above for 
which frail elderly (and others) need assistance from relatives 
and or others, we thus have to (re-)establish borderlines 
between public and private (family) responsibilities for 
incomes, housing and other daily needs. The good news is 
that in general, the need for LTC only kicks in at a later age—
and only for a smaller share of the population over 80. We 
can plan for that, fiscally, organizationally, and in regard to 
manpower.17 There are many examples across the world of 
countries that have already experimented with models of LTC. 
Ikegami’s contribution illustrates how Japan introduced and 
adapted several plans and policies for its aging population. 
These included the introduction of new LTC insurances, 
first the reduction but later increases of coinsurance, the 
redefinition of the role of hospitals and new LTC facilities, a 
country-wide assessment tool for home care, training of home 
helpers and expansion of day care facilities for elderly, shifts 
in the responsibilities over needs assessment and user fees 
between the national and local level. The development of LTC 
policies also entailed several attempts of cost containments 
like reduced fees for providers, cutting benefits and means 
testing (as in other countries, the latter measures were only 
moderately successful). 
Japan’s experience is not unique. Holland was the first 
country that introduced its population-wide LTC insurance 
(the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act, AWBZ, of 1968). 
The AWBZ aimed to alleviate families and private charities 
from the financial burden of taking care of frail elderly and 
handicapped relatives. That fueled a rapid expansion of the 
capacity of retirement homes, nursing homes and other care 
institutions. It also allowed the existing (private but non for 
profit) home care organizations to expand their services. 
Three decades later, in an effort to rein in public LTC 
spending (in particular the popular cash benefit scheme) and 
to reduce the volume of institutional care, Dutch government 
basically dismantled this LTC insurance and largely shifted 
responsibilities to the municipal level.18 Germany followed the 
Dutch model and introduced its own LTC insurance in 1995. 
This social insurance mostly benefitted the existing welfare 
agencies that already were providing both home care and 
inpatient services. It also included a cash benefit scheme for 
families providing care for their frail elderly. The introduction 
of the LTC arrangements, in all three nations, expanded 
the public responsibilities for the financing and provision 
of LTC. While the organizational form and administrative 
responsibilities have shifted over time, in all three nations 
these arrangements became firmly embedded as integral part 
of the modern welfare states, fueling public expectation that 
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